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Abstract
The public's beliefs about the economic impact of immigration on host
nations' economies is significantly more negative than both the beliefs of
economists, and what much of the empirical evidence would suggest. In
an attempt to explain this disparity, and the wide range of beliefs about
what should largely be a matter of fact, I develop a simple model of belief
formation based on the concept of motivated reasoning: when coming to
a conclusion people are influenced by the desire to come to a particular
conclusion (a directional goal) and by the desire for their conclusion
to be justified by evidence (an accuracy goal). This gives agents an
incentive to manipulate their beliefs. The model yields several testable
hypotheses: positive beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants
should be negatively associated with a preference for living in an ethnically
homogeneous society; the effect of education depends crucially on the
aforementioned preference; finally, beliefs should reflect the probability of
receiving supporting evidence. An empirical analysis using the European
Social Survey 2002/2003 data finds support for all three hypotheses.
JEL classification: D83, J61
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Despite the popular belief that immigrants have a large adverse im-
pact on the wages and employment opportunities of the native-born
population, the literature on this question does not provide much sup-
port for this conclusion.
Freidberg and Hunt (1995)
Beggars can't be choosers, you deceive yourself as best you can.
Péter Esterházy (2005), Celestial Harmonies
1 Introduction
The economic impact of immigration on host nations' economies is a much stud-
ied subject. As with many economic issues, there is a range of opinions amongst
economists as to whether immigrants improve or reduce the economic well-being
of natives, however the distribution of these opinions is strikingly different from
the beliefs of the public. The difference in beliefs between economists and the
public is highly significant: in the Survey of Americans and Economists on the
Economy, more than three quarters of economists said that excessive immi-
gration was 'not a reason at all' for problems in the economy, whereas a large
majority of non-economists regarded it as either of minor or major importance.1
There is a large body of empirical evidence suggesting that immigration is
economically beneficial. More specifically, that immigration boosts growth,2 in-
creases innovation and creation of new businesses,3 has little or no impact on
wages or employment of natives,4 and that the average fiscal contribution of
immigrants is positive and, in the cases of New Zealand and the United King-
dom, greater than the average contribution of natives.5 On the other hand, in
the European Social Survey 2002/2003, only 37 percent of respondents believed
that immigration is good for the economy, while only 20 percent believed that
1Caplan (2002)
2Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)
3Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2009)
4Blanchflower et al. (2007); Freidberg and Hunt (1995). For a dissenting opinion see Borjas
(2003)
5Gott and Johnston (2002); Nana and Williams (1999)
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immigrants contribute as much in taxes as they consume in health and welfare
services.
To begin to explain this disparity we need to develop a model of belief
formation. This paper presents a simple model of belief formation based on
the concept of motivated reasoning: when coming to a conclusion, people are
influenced by the desire to come to a particular conclusion, and by the desire
for their conclusion to be justified by evidence. Following the terminology of
Kunda (1990), the former is a directional goal, the latter an accuracy goal. This
combination of preferences gives agents an incentive to manipulate their beliefs.
The model yields several testable hypotheses: beliefs that run counter to the
desired conclusion are less likely to be held by people with stronger directional
goals; the effect of the accuracy goal depends crucially on the relative strength
of the directional goal; finally, beliefs should reflect the probability of receiving
supporting evidence.
The implications of this general model are tested for the specific example
of beliefs about the economic impact of immigration: using data on four differ-
ent economic beliefs, and proxies for the strength of directional and accuracy
goals from the European Social Survey, probit regressions find support for all
three hypotheses. Beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants are strongly
correlated with a number of both attitudinal and economic variables. These re-
sults suggest that exisiting empirical work on determinants of attitudes towards
immigration needs to be reconsidered.
Motivated reasoning is a well documented psychological phenomenon. A
number of studies exist showing a change in reasoning and evaluation of evidence
when directional and accuracy goals are present, many of which are summarized
in Kunda (1990), who states:
. . . people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion at-
tempt to be rational and to construct a justification of their desired
conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. . . . In other
words, they maintain an illusion of objectivity. To this end, they
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search memory for those beliefs that could support their desired
conclusion.
One experimental example is Taber and Lodge (2006). This paper looks at how
the evaluation of arguments about gun control and affirmative action depends
on the strength of prior attitudes (a measure of a directional goal) and political
sophistication (a measure of an accuracy goal). They found that participants in
their experiment spent more time considering, and were more likely disregard
arguments that opposed a strong prior attitude as compared to arguments that
were in agreement. They also found that this effect is greater for those who are
more politically sophisticated.
In the context of this paper, the directional goal is to oppose immigration
because of an inherent preference against the presence of immigrants in the
country. This preference could arise from simply discomfort at being exposed
to foreign cultures, a perceived threat to a strongly held idea of national identy,
or xenophobia with evolutionary roots.6 A distrust of foreigners is ubiquitous
amongst human (and animal) societies7 and is simply taken as exogenous in this
paper.
The accuracy goal is a desire for one's opinion to be based on fact, possibly
to strengthen one's belief and become more persuasive, to reduce cognitive dis-
sonance, or to not appear racist to oneself or others. A preference for accurate
beliefs will clearly be favoured by evolution in many circumstances. Alchian
(1950) and Friedman (1953) argue that economic agents who make decisions
based on false beliefs will be eliminated from markets. More generally, human-
ity's desire to gain greater understanding our environment has been essential in
the astounding technological progress of the past millenia.
In the model presented in Section 2, the concepts from the theory of mo-
tivated reasoning generates demand for beliefs. The supply side is provided
6Peck (1990) shows that outsider exclusion can be favoured by evolution, even when it
incurs a large cost
7(The) xenophobic principle has been documented in virtually every group of animals
displaying higher forms of social organization... Human behaviour provides some of the best
exemplification of the xenophobia principle. Wilson (2000)
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by the memory-management model of Benabou and Tirole (2002). The agent
receives some information about the economic impact of immigrants, anything
from a media article about a government report to an anecdote from a friend at
the pub. They then process this signal in some way, which may involve either
sub-conscious repression of undesirable information, or an attempt to actively
convince themselves that the report is just damn lies and statisics, or that the
event described in the anecdote was just a one-off occurrence and in no way
representative of the world at large. From the information that is retained, the
agent forms a belief about the economic impact of immigrants and, based on this
belief, forms an opinion on whether immigration numbers should be increased
or decreased. The satisfaction they obtain from holding this opinion depends
on a utility function that contains both a directional goal (whether the opinion
is the one they want to hold), and accuracy goal (how close their opinion is to
the belief they have formed).
Two results of the model are reasonably intuitive: firstly, a stronger desire
not to live with foreigners results in more effort being put into discounting
good news about immigrants, thus a higher chance of believing that immigrants
are bad for the economy and holding the opinion that there should be fewer
immigrants; secondly, the higher the probability of receiving a positive signal,
the less effort is put into discounting it if it arrives.
A more complex result relates to the effect of accuracy goals on directional
goals: do strong accuracy goals increase or decrease distortions in opinions due
to the presence of a directional goal? On the one hand it seems intuitive that a
greater desire for accuracy should reduce distortions, however people who would
suffer large costs from coming to a conclusion they didn't like may put more
effort into justifying the preferred conclusion. There are conflicting opinions on
this question in the psychology and sociology literature.8 The model suggests
that the effect of a stronger accuracy goal depends on the relative strength of
the directional goal. If the directional goal is relatively weak, strengthening the
8Jackman and Muha (1984), for example, contains a review of the inconclusive debate on
the effect of education on intergroup negativism.
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accuracy goal results in less distortion of beliefs and a higher chance of wanting
more immigrants; if the directional goal is sufficiently strong then the agent will
want to reduce immigrant numbers regardless of their economic impact, and
increasing the accuracy goal leads to more effort being put into manipulating
beliefs. This last result is in line with Taber and Lodge.
A slight variation of the model shows how the demand for particular beliefs
generated by motivated reasoning can be satisfied by selection of media sources.
This gives an explanation of the demand for biased media, even for rational
agents aware of the bias.
To test these results I use data from the European Social Survey 2002/2003.
This dataset contains detailed questions relating to beliefs about the economic
impact of immigrants, attitudes to race and ethnicity, as well as information
about the socio-economic status of respondants which closely match variables
in the model. Probit regressions find evidence to support the results derived
from the model.
The economics literature on attitudes towards immigrants has largely been
concerned with identifying the roles of economic and non-economic deter-
minants: do people want to reduce the number of immigrants because it is in
their economic self-interest, or because of prejudice or a perceived threat to their
national identity. This is of importance to policy-makers who support immigra-
tion and those concerned about the discriminatory and often violent treatment
of immigrants. If opposition to immigration is largely driven by economic con-
cerns, these can be addressed through relatively simple policies, compensating
those who lose out. If opposition is primarily caused by xenophobia, the is-
sue is much more difficult. The empirical results of this paper show that it is
extremely difficult to disentangle economic from non-economic factors.
Not surprisingly, racism is one of the strongest determinants of attitudes to-
wards immigrants (Mayda, 2004). The model of Section 2 suggests that racism
has not only a direct effect on attitudes, but also an effect on the formation of
beliefs about immigrants and their economic impact. This will affect the other
channels through which individual characteristics determine attitudes. For ex-
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ample, it is commonly argued that low-skilled workers should oppose immigra-
tion that will increase the ratio of low-skilled to high-skilled workers because of
a negative impact on wages predicted by some factor endowment models (and
a simple labour supply/labour demand argument). There is econometric evi-
dence to suggest that indeed people do oppose immigration more strongly when
immigrants are predominantly of their skill level, and this is treated as evidence
that economic, as well as non-economic factors are important in formation of
attitudes. However, given that most empirical evidence shows that immigra-
tion seems to have little negative impact on the work opportunities of natives,
it is apparent that what is important is not economic factors, but perceived
economic factors, that is beliefs.
Nikolaj Malchow-Moller and Skaksen (2006)move in this direction by re-
gressing attitudes to immigrants not simply on individual characteristics (high-
skilled, low skilled etc), but also on these characteristics interacted with beliefs
about the economic impact of migrants: poor people should oppose immigra-
tion only if they are poor and if they believe that the immigration is bad for the
poor. Their paper finds that economic factors play a sizable and statistically
significant role in peoples' opinions on whether immigrant numbers should be
increased or decreased. However, if beliefs about the economic impact are de-
termined endogenously with respect to opinions about immigrant numbers, as
suggested here, these results could be spurious.
The only paper I am aware of that looks in any detail at the determinants
of beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants is Thomas K. Bauer and
Zimmermann (2000). The focus of their paper is cross-country differences in
attitudes and how they relate to immigration policy. They use data from the
International Social Science Project. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) note that
the belief that immigrants are good for the economy is positively correlated with
education.
An interesting empirical paper which presents results explained by this model,
but not by traditional economic theory is Dustman and Preston (2000), which
looks at whether attitudes to immigration in the UK are associated with racial
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attitudes, labour market or welfare concerns. They find that labour market con-
cerns are significantly related with negative attitudes to immigration, but only
among highly educated people. Among workers with little education, attitudes
to immigration are only significantly associated with racial attitudes. This runs
counter to what one would expect given that immigrants to the UK are more
likely to be competing with low-skilled workers. However it is consistent with
the notion that more educated people have stronger accuracy goals, and so have
a stronger need to find reasons to justify their opinions.
2 The Theory
2.1 Memory Management With Motivated Reasoning9
The agent receives a signal about some aspect of the economic impact of immi-
grants: the signal σ = 0, received with probability 1− ρ, is evidence that there
should be fewer immigrants; σ = 1, occuring with probability ρ, indicates that
there should be more immigrants . If σ = 1, the agent may try to forget or
convince themselves it is false. They choose λ, the probability the informa-
tion will be dismissed, at a pyschological cost M (λ).10 The information that is
recalled is then σˆ = 1 if σ = 1 and the agent fails to dismiss the information,
and σˆ = 1 otherwise.
Based on this recall, the agent forms a belief b = E [σ|σˆ], according to Bayes
law as they are aware of their tendency to manipulate information . If σ = 1,
then b = 1 = b1, but if σ = 0 then
b =
ρλ
1− ρ+ ρλ = b0 (1)
Finally the agent takes an action a = 0 (a = 1) which is to support a
policy of reducing (increasing) the number of immigrants. The utility from
9For a more detailed explanation and justification of the memory management side of this
model, see Benabou and Tirole (2002).
10The case where M(λ) = 0 is considered in the section 2.2.
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from this action depends on three factors: the satisfaction of a directional goal,
an accuracy goal, and the effort of manipulating information:
U (a, b, λ) = δ (1− a)− αf(|b− a|)−M(λ) (2)
The parameter δ ≥ 0 represents the weight the agent places on the directional
goal. This captures the preference for the agent to live in a society with fewer
immigrants, and is increasing in strength of xenophobia, or preference for living
in an ethnically homogenous country.
The parameter α ≥ 0 represents the strength of the accuracy goal (increasing
in the desire to rationalize one's opinion). The function f (.) is the psychological
cost of taking an action which is not justified by evidence, increasing in the
distance of the action taken from what the agent believes to be objectively best,
that is f (0) = 0 and f ′ (x) ≶ 0,∀x ≶ 0. M(.)is assumed to be convex.
Lemma 1 After receiving the signal σˆ = 0 the agent will always choose a = 0.
Proof : Suppose there is an equilibrium where the agent chooses a = 1 after
receiving the signal σˆ = 0. This implies that U
(
1, b0, λ¯
)
> U
(
0, b0, λ¯
)
where λ¯
is the equilibrium value of λ, i.e. δ − αf (b0) < −αf (1− b0) < 0. If the agent
received the signal σˆ = 1 they would select a = 0 if and only if δ − αf (1) >
0 but δ − αf (1) < δ − αf (b0) < 0 because b0 < 1. Therefore they must
choose a = 1 regardless of the signal. This gives them an expected utility of
−λαf (1− b0)−M(λ) which is maximised by choosing λ = 0. But if λ¯ = 0 then
b0 = 0 and U
(
0, b0, λ¯
)
= δ > 0 = U
(
1, b0, λ¯
)
.
Lemma 2 After receiving the signal σˆ = 1 the agent will choose a = 1 if and
only if δ < αf (1).
Proof : U
(
1, 1, λ¯
)
= −M(λ¯) > δ − αf (1) −M(λ¯) = U (0, b0, λ¯) if and only
if δ < αf (1).
Proposition 1
9
a) If δ < αf (1), the equilibrim value of λ is decreasing in α and in-
creasing in δ.
b) If δ > αf (1), the equilibrim value of λ is increasing in α and unaf-
fected by δ.
c) The equilibrim value of λ is decreasing in ρ.
Proof :
a) If δ < αf (1), by Lemmas 1 and 2, the agent solvesmax
λ
λ (δ − αf (b0))−
M (λ), which gives the first order condition M ′ (λ) − δ + αf (b0) =
0.11 Substituting for b0 gives the condition for a perfect bayesian
equilibrium12:
M ′ (λ)− δ + αf
(
ρλ
1− ρ+ ρλ
)
= 0 (3)
Differentiating with respect to α gives:
0 =
∂λ
∂α
M ′′ (λ) + α
∂b0
∂λ
∂λ
∂α
f ′ (b0) + f (b0)
∂λ
∂α
= − f (b0)
M ′′ (λ) + α∂b0∂λ f
′ (b0)
< 0
because
∂b0
∂λ
=
ρ(1− ρ)
(1− ρ+ ρλ)2 > 0
11For simplicity I am ignoring the constraint that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and assuming that parameters
are such that solutions are interior. Convexity of M guarantees that if the first order condition
specifies λ < 0, then the constrained objective function is maximised at λ = 0, and if λ > 1 is
specified then the optimal value is 1. This is also true for all the following maximisation prob-
lems. Strictly speaking in Proposition 3, increasing (decreasing) should be non-decreasing
(non-increasing), the difference only being relevant when the constraint on λ is binding.
12Here a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is characterised by λ being chosen optimally given
the assessment of the reliability of b0, and that assessment being determined by Bayes rule
and the strategy used for selecting λ.
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Differentiating the equilibrium condition with respect to δ gives:
0 =
∂λ
∂δ
M ′′ (λ)− 1 + α∂b0
∂λ
∂λ
∂α
f ′ (b0)
∂λ
∂δ
=
1
M ′′ (λ) + α∂b0∂λ f
′ (b0)
> 0
b) If δ > αf (1), by Propositions 1 and 2, the agent solves max
λ
δ −
α (λf (b0) + (1− λ) f (1)) −M (λ), which gives the first order con-
dition M ′ (λ) − α (f (1)− f (b0)) = 0. The condition for a perfect
bayesian equilibrium is now:
M ′ (λ)− α
(
f (1)− f
(
ρλ
1− ρ+ ρλ
))
= 0 (4)
Differentiating with respect to α gives:
0 =
∂λ
∂α
M ′′ (λ) + α
∂b0
∂λ
∂λ
∂α
f ′ (b0)− f (1) + f (b0)
∂λ
∂α
= − f (1)− f (b0)
M ′′ (λ) + α∂b0∂λ f
′ (b0)
> 0
Clearly the equilibrium condition is independent of δ.
c) Differentiating either equilibrium condition with respect to ρ gives:
0 =
∂λ
∂ρ
M ′′ (λ) + α
∂λ
∂ρ (1− ρ) + λ
(1− ρ+ ρλ)2 f
′ (b0)
∂λ
∂ρ
= − αλf
′ (b0)
(1− ρ+ ρλ)2M ′′ (λ) + (1− ρ) f ′ (b0)
< 0
Figure 1 illustrates the first two parts of the proposition when ρ = 0.5, f (x) =
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|x|, andM (λ) = 0.5λ2. The graph shows what happens to the equilibrium value
of λ when δ is held fixed at 0.5 and α varies between zero and one. Two regimes
emerge: one where the agent can be swayed by the evidence (δ < αf (1)), and
one where their mind is already made up (δ > αf (1)).
Increasing δ increases the value of increasing λ only in so far as it increases
the probability of choosing a = 0. If δ > αf (1), the agent always chooses a = 0,
so there is no point in increasing λ further.
The differing effects of the accuracy goal can be understood as follows. There
are two consequences of increasing λ: the probability of receiving favourable in-
formation is increased, and b is increased in the event that σˆ = 0. Manipulation
means that the agent is more likely to receive the information they want, but it
will be of less value because in equilibrium they know the degree of manipu-
lation. In the first regime, strengthening the accuracy goal makes manipulation
less desirable for two reasons: it directly reduces the benefit of receiving the pre-
ferred signal because of the increase in α (the payoff when σˆ = 1 is unchanged
because in this case a = b and there is no cost associated with the accuracy
goal); it also indirectly reduces this benefit by increasing the uncertainty that
a = 0 is the correct action through the effect on b. Intuitively, the more the
agent cares about making the correct decision, the less they will want to fool
themselves given that they are aware of the self-deception.
When the signal is irrelevant to the decision of the agent, the costs of in-
creasing the accuracy goal occur regardless of the signal that is recalled, but
the increase will be greater when σˆ = 1 because f (1) > f (b0)∀b0thus there will
be an incentive to increase the probability of receiving the favoured information
despite the associated increase in b0. Here there is a large benefit of receiving
a signal that makes them feel good about the decision they are bound to make
anyway.
The only effect of an increase in ρ is to reduce the trustworthyness of the
signal σˆ = 0. This reduces the value of manipulation in either regime.
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2.2 A Variation: Selection of Media as Information Man-
agement
One major channel through which information about immigrants is acquired is
the media. It could be argued that misperceptions about the economic impact
of immigrants results simply from biased media. There are two major short-
comings with this argument. Firstly, where does the demand for biased media
originate?13 If people have existing prejudices, why do they need to be told
what they already know. Secondly, people must be at least partially aware
that the news they are receiving is biased if they are deliberately receiving it
from a source they know to be biased, so why believe it?
These questions can be answered by a slight adjustment of the model pre-
sented in this paper. The parameter λ can be thought of as the degree of bias
of a particular news-source, giving the agent a choice of a continuum of sources
with bias ranging from zero to one. Now λ represents the probability that a
story involving positive news about immigrants will be censored.
In most circumstances it would be unreasonable to suppose that selecting a
more biased source would entail greater psychological costs (here the memory
management equivalent, censoring, is done for you) soM(λ) will be set to zero.14
Proposition 2
a) If δ < αf (1), the equilibrim value of λ is decreasing in α and ρ and
increasing in δ.
b) If δ > αf (1), in equilibrium λ = 1.
The differences between Propositions 1 and 2 are entirely due to the absence
of memory management costs. Without these costs it is always optimal for
an individual with a sufficiently strong directional goal to isolate themselves
completely from information that would contradict the position they want to
13A free and commercially driven media is assumed, abstracting from political manipulation
14There may, of course, be some social censure for consuming particularly extreme media
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(and certainly will) hold. They do this by choosing media that censors such
information with probability one.
This model can resolve the two shortcomings mentioned above. There is
demand for biased media when both directional and accuracy goals are present:
people want to read what they already know in order to justify opinions they
have an exogenous desire to hold. Also, even when agents are perfectly rational,
they can still fool themselves to some extent, making it beneficial to consume
media they know to be biased.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Estimation Strategy
Without precise data about the prior beliefs of an individual, and knowledge
of what new information they received, it is not possible to directly test the
model15. However, testing the general implications of the propositions derived
from the model of Section 2 is relatively straight forward given reasonable prox-
ies for α, δ and ρ. In order to do this I estimate the following equation:
beliefi = γ0δi + γ1δi · αi + γ2αi + γ3Pi + βXi + i
where beliefi is a dummy variable which equals one if a given belief is held, δi
and αi are measures of the strength of an individual's directional and accuracy
goals, Pi is a vector of variables that could increase the probability of receiving
positive signals, Xi is a vector of other control variables, and i is a random
error.
The first hypothesis that will be tested is that the probability that one
believes that immigrants are good for the economy (which in equilibrium is equal
to ρ(1− λ)) is affected negatively by a preference against living in proximity to
foreigners. This requires γ0 < 0 .
15This could be feasible in laboratory experiments à la Taber and Lodge
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Secondly, the effect of the accuracy goal should be negative for those with
a strong directional goal, and positive for others. This would require the total
effect of the γ1 and γ2 terms to be positive (negative
16) for high (low) values of
δi. A necessary condition is γ1 < 0.17
The hypothesis that a higher probability of receiving good signals about
immigration leads to more pro-immigrant beliefs would be supported by γ3 > 0.
3.2 Data
To estimate the equation we need variables to proxy for the beliefs, directional
goal and accuracy goal. The European Social Survey 2002/2003 provides the
necessary data. The survey covers 22 countries: the EU-15, Norway, Switzer-
land, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Israel.
3.2.1 Belief Variables
The first three dependent belief variables are generated from the following
questions: Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy
that people come to live here from other countries?, Most people who come
to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On
balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or
put in more than they take out?, and would you say that people who come to
live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help
to create new jobs? . The responses are on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is
the most negative view of the impact of immigrants and 10 is the most positive.
For the final dependent variable the respondent is asked to what extent they
agree with the following statement: Average wages and salaries are generally
brought down by people coming to live and work here. The answers range
from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly). The questions are converted
16or zero for the media selection version of the model
17Strictly speaking this can only be derived from the model under certain assumptions about
the support of α and δ in the data e.g. if δ is binary then the support of α would have to be
[0,1]. However I think that expecting a negative interaction term captures well the flavour of
the proposition.
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into a dummy variables (econ, fiscal, jobs and wage), taking the value 1 if the
respondent thinks that immigrants are beneficial, and 0 if the respondent thinks
that immigrants are harmful or have no impact.18 Descriptive statistics of these
variables in the sample used for the main analysis are contained in Table XXX.
3.2.2 Directional goal
Two alternative variables are used for the directional goal. For the first, ideallive,
I use the following question: Suppose you were choosing where to live. Which
of the three types of area on this card would you ideally wish to live in?: An
area where almost nobody was of a different race or ethnic group from most
[country] people (1), Some people were of a different race or ethnic group from
most [country] people (2), Many people were of a different race or ethnic group
(3), It would make no difference (4). The variable ideallive is one if the response
to this question is (1), and zero for other responses.19
Strictly speaking, this variable only makes sense as a directional goal in this
context if the respondent is of the majority ethnic group. For this reason, in
the results that are presented here, the sample is restricted to such individuals.
The results are robust to lifting this restriction.
The second uses responses to the statement it is better for a country if al-
most everyone shares the same customs and traditions. The variable samecul-
ture takes a value from 1 if the respondent strongly disagrees with the statement,
to 5 if they strongly agree.
These variables are indications of a desire to live in an ethnically or culturally
homogenous society, which provides a reason to oppose immigration that is not
related to its macroeconomic impact.
18I assume that most respondents would take the view that an increase in average wages is
beneficial.
19All the main results are robust to replacing ideallive with dummy variables for each
reponse, or a single variable taking the values 1 to 4.
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3.2.3 Accuracy goal
Again, I try two alternatives to proxy for the accuracy goal. The first is years
of education (educ). An essential part of education is training people to argue
logically, present and defend ideas and arguments. More educated people should
be more likely to feel that justifying decisions with evidence is desirable and feel
a stronger need to do so.
The second proxy (nwsnp) is time spent reading about politics and current
affairs in newspapers. Reading about these issues in a newspaper enables people
to find facts to develop an informed opinion. Presumably people who spend
more time doing this are more likely to think it important that their opinions
are based on evidence. The variable takes the following values: 0 (no time at
all), 1 (less than 1/2 hour), 2 (1/2 hour to 1 hour), 3 (more than 1 hour, up to
1 1/2 hours), 4 (more than 1 1/2 hour, up to 2 hours), 5 (more than 2 hour,
up to 2 1/2 hours), 6 (more than 2 1/2 hour, up to 3 hours), 7 (more than 3
hours).
3.2.4 Controls
The dummy variable male is set to one if the respondent is male, birth year
is the year of birth and urban is a dummy which equals one if the respondent
lives in a town or city. The variable immigrant parents is the number of the
respondents parents who are immigrants, and immigrant friends is 1/2/3 if the
respondent has no/a few/several friends who have are immigrants. Political
orientation is captured by left-right, which is on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10
being the most right-wing. The dummy variables high skill, retired, unemployed
and paid employment are set to one if the respondent falls into that category.
Being high skilled is defined according to ISCO occupation codes and includes
legislators, managers, professionals and technicians. Unemployment includes
only those seeking employment. Income is measured on a categorical scale from
1 to 12.20 Summary statistics of these variables can be found in Table 2. Xi
201 = less than 150 Euro monthly; 2= 150-300 Euro; 3= 300-500; 4 = 500-1000; 5 = 1000-
1500; 6 = 1500-2000; 7 = 2000-2500; 8 = 2500-3000; 9 = 3000-5000; 10 = 5000-7500; 11 =
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also contains a full set of country dummies.
3.3 Results
The equation is estimated using a probit model.21 Observations are weighted
to take into account country population size and non-random sampling within
countries as advised in the ESS guidelines. All four possible combinations of
accuracy and direction goals are estimated. When nwsnp is used, years of
education is also controlled for to account for aspects of education not related
to accuracy concerns. Results are presented in Table 3. The marginal effect of
the interaction term is calculated using the inteff Stata command.22
The effect of a preference against living with people of a different ethnicity is
strongly associated with a reduction in the probability of holding beliefs about
a positive economic impact of immigrants: the coefficients are all negative,
and mostly significant. This effect is large, reducing the probability of holding
positive beliefs by between 3 and 18 percentage points. A preference for cultural
homogeneity has a similar effect.
The coefficient on the interaction term is also always negative, and significant
for half the regressions. To give an idea of the magnitude of this effect we can
consider the change implied by increasing the number of years of education
from 12 to 16 (roughly the difference between completion of high school and
completion of a university degree) for different values of ideallive. For ideallive =
0, the probability that the respondent believes that immigrants are good for the
economy increases by 8.4%, whereas if the respondent has a strong preference
against living near people of a different ethnicity the increase is only 5.9%.
Someone who spends more than 3 hours per day reading news about politics
and current affairs is 18.9% more likely to believe that immigration creates
employment than someone who spends no time if they have no preference for
cultural homogeneity (sameculture=1), however that figure is only 2.6% if they
7500-10000; 12 = more than 10000
21The results are qualitatively unchanged when OLS is used
22For details of the program, and why it is necessary, see Ai et al. (2004)
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have a strong preference (sameculture=5). 23
The total effect of an increase in years of education and nwsnp is always
positive, albeit reduced by a strong directional goal. If the only consequence
of education or reading a newspaper was to strengthen accuracy goals, then
this would run counter to the prediction of the model that the effect should
differ in sign depending on the strength of the directional goal. However it
is likely that these variables will be to some degree associated with greater
economic literacy which could increase the likelihood that individuals have more
positive beliefs about the economic impact of immigration. It may also be
associated with greater exposure to positive signals about the economic impact
of immigrants, for example by meeting more highly educated immigrants in the
case of education.
One interesting finding is that older people are significantly more likely to
believe that immigrants are good for the economy in all the ways considered
here.24 This result is in contrast to the literature which finds that older people
tend to be more strongly against immigration, and highlights the importance
of non-economic factors in the formation of opinions about whether immigrant
numbers should be increased or decreased. That people who formed their eco-
nomic beliefs in the fifties and sixties believe that immigrants are good for the
economy can be explained by the fact that this was a time when immigration
was being actively encouraged by most European governments so there was a
high probability of hearing pro-immigration evidence from official sources.
The coefficients on high skill and income are also consistently positive, and
significant for all dependent variables apart from fiscal. High-skill and wealthy
individuals are more likely to know high-skill and wealthy immigrants, that
is those who are more likely to have high wages or set up businesses creating
employment.
The probability of all four pro-immigrant beliefs is increasing in the number
23These are the point estimates calculated using Clarify, a program written by Gary King
et al.King et al. (2000) The figures presented are based on the regressions with the full set of
controls, and all variables other than educ and ideallive set at their mean.
24This was also found by Bauer et al. (2000) using a variable similar to econ.
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of immigrant parents and friends. One possibility is that having immigrant par-
ents and friends increases the likelihood of receiving positive signals. Another
is that having immigrant friends can be viewed as a proxy for a preference for
having an ethnically diverse society. This would provide a directional working
in the opposite direction to ideallive and nwsnp, increasing the probability of an
individual ignoring bad signals about the economic impact of immigrants. Sim-
ilarly, to the extent that supporters of right wing parties have a more exclusive
concept of national identity, the fact that coefficient on the political orienta-
tion variable left-right is negative and highly significant for all four beliefs can
be explained as representing another directional goal in the same direction as
ideallive.25
The only variable that is significant with different signs for different beliefs is
male: men are more likely to believe that immigrants increase employment and
decrease wages. This is consistent with men thinking in terms of a simple supply
and demand set-up. Immigration (an increase in labour supply), would then
have those effects. Men are also more likely to think that immigration is good
for the economy in general, which is a possible contradiction my assumption
that respondents to the survey would consider a reduction in wages as a negative
impact.
People living in a rural area are less likely to believe that immigrants have
a negative fiscal impact. This could be because immigrants in rural areas are
more likely to work in cash-in-hand jobs and thus pay less tax than immigrants
working in urban areas.
3.4 Robustness
The first claim for robustness is the similarity in patterns of effects of accuracy
goals, directional goals, and their interaction across a range of economic beliefs
and using combinations of two different proxies for preferences. The importance
25Using left-right in place of ideallive in the interaction term finds significant and negative
interaction effects for dependent variables fiscal and wage. The interaction coefficients on econ
and jobs are also negative. Using imfr instead gives positive coefficients on the interaction
terms as predicted, significant at the 5% level in the fiscal regression.
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of the range of beliefs is discussed in section 4.
Several alternative definitions of the dependent variable have been tested:
retaining the original values from the questionnaire (0-10, for econ, fiscal, and
jobs; 1-5 for wage), and using a dummy variable as in the reported results but
either eliminating the middle value or giving it a value of 1 instead of 0. The
major differences are in the significance of the interaction terms; other results
are for the most part unchanged.26 When the middle value is excluded, all
interaction terms are negative, with seven being significant at the 1 or 5% level.
However, when the middle value is set to 1, five of the 16 possible interaction
terms become positive (but none significant), with only one being both negative
and significant. Using all values, 14 out of 16 interaction terms are negative,
but only one significantly so.
Two things make the reported dependent variables most appropriate. Firstly,
a dummy variable is preferable to the values reported in the questionnaire,
because it should reduce measurement error: only the extremes of the scale
(0 and 10) were clearly defined, so it is not clear that one person who gave
a response of 8 is really more firm in their belief than a different person who
responded with a 7. On the other hand, it does seem reasonable to assume that
a response below the middle value indicates a belief in the opposite direction
to a response above the middle value, and that the middle value indicates no
firm belief. Secondly, the middle value has been included with negative beliefs
because it fits better the idea behind the model, and also the evidence from
psychology experiments: people forget or dismiss information they do not want;
they are not at liberty to invent beliefs that suit them.
4 Discussion
Negative beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants are strongly related
to a desire to live in an ethnically homogenous area. It is difficult to explain this
26A notable exception is the effect of male on fiscal, which loses significance when the middle
value is excluded, and becomes significantly negative when the middle value is set to 1.
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without recourse to something like motivated reasoning. The beliefs are related
to the macroeconomy whereas the explanatory variable relates to the locality the
respondent would like to live in. For the belief that immigrants have a negative
fiscal impact one could create a chain of reasoning that this belief coincides with
a belief that immigrants tend to be unemployed, thus poorer, and so the areas
they live in are less desirable, and if immigrants are also believed to be from
a different ethnic group then this would explain the correlation. On the other
hand, this sort of argument falls down for beliefs about immigrants taking jobs
from natives.
Negative beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants are also strongly
to the belief that cultural homogeneity is better for a country. Of course if cul-
tural homogeneity improves communication and cooperation then immigration
from different cultures would have a direct negative impact on economic growth
(if this was not counteracted by the flow of new ideas, or complementarities
between people of different cultures), but it is difficult to see how economic rea-
soning could convincingly relate a desire for cultural homogeneity to the labour
market beliefs considered here.
What alternative explanations are there for the interaction effect between
education and xenophobia? One possibility is that those who have grown up
in an ethnically homogenous area have also acquired a desire to live in such an
area, perhaps from their parents who chose to live there in the first place. For
such people, local schooling would have resulted in less contact with immigrants
from ethnic minorities, and fewer opportunities to develop favourable views
about them. However it is unclear why unfavourable views about their economic
impact should develop in the absence of a motivational reasoning type argument.
The range of beliefs considered here is particularly important, as it suggests
that the link between xenophobia and beliefs is not based on simple stereotypes.
If the reason that people didn't want to live around members of a different eth-
nicity was because of negative stereotypes about characteristics of that ethnicity,
such as laziness or criminality, then one would expect them to have negative be-
liefs about the impact immigration of people of that ethnicity on the economy
22
in general and on government finances. However these negative stereotypes are
not consistent with the beliefs that immigrants take jobs from natives and work
for low wages, which would suggest immigrants are not lazy but at least as
hard-working as natives. All beliefs studied here, whether they imply positive
or negative stereotypes of immigrants, are influenced in the same way by proxies
for accuracy goals, directional goals and their interactions.
Alternative explanations and objections about choice of proxies may be
raised against any given regression presented here, but the fact that the re-
sults are so consistent across a variety of proxies and beliefs, speaks loudly in
favour of this model of motivated reasoning.
These results demonstrate all kinds of difficulties in analysing the determi-
nants of attitudes towards immigration. Typically in the existing literature a
variable indicating whether an individual wants more or fewer immigrants is
regressed on variables which may include a measure of individual skill-level,
education, beliefs about social or economic impact of immigrants, sometimes
a measure of racism, and sometimes country level information which in theory
should indicate the skill-level of immigrants.
The first problem with using beliefs is one of reverse causality: rather than
wanting less immigration because they believe immigrants have a harmful im-
pact, people may believe immigrants have a harmful impact because they want
fewer immigrants. Secondly, the desire to reduce immigration and beliefs that
immigrants are harmful are both partly determined by xenophobia, resulting in
missing variable bias if this is not carefully controlled for.
Education and a high skill-level, both often used in looking for the role of
economic self interest in attitudes towards immigrants, are strongly correlated
with positive beliefs about the economic impact of immigrants, and negatively
correlated with xenophobia.
Finally, it is dangerous to interpret GDP as simply a proxy for skill-levels in a
country as has been done in some previous papers, because it is also significantly
negatively correlated with average levels of xenophobia. Figure 3 shows the
average level of the variable sameculture in a country, plotted against 2002 per-
23
capita GDP.
5 Conclusion
Different people have different beliefs about the facts of immigration. This can
partially be explained by people receiving different signals, but even controlling
for important socio-economic factors, beliefs vary systematically according to
preferences that are not directly related to the economics of immigration. This
systematic variation is consistent with the predictions of a model of belief forma-
tion based on the concept of motivated reasoning. An additional contribution
of this paper is to provide a theoretical model which explains the demand for
biased media in rational agents who are aware of the bias.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium λ
Figure 2: Country average sameculture vs per-capita GDP
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Table 1: Belief variables, summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean
econ 39769 0.38
fiscal 39551 0.21
jobs 40455 0.26
wage 39828 0.37
Table 2: Independent variables, summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
educ 41717 11.85 4.03
nwsnp 31645 1.25 0.94
ideallive 41179 0.33 0.47
sameculture 41638 3.37 1.11
birthyear 42101 1955 18.28
male 42304 0.47 0.5
urban 42159 0.62 0.48
immigrant parents 42071 0.27 0.64
immigrant friends 42109 0.63 0.74
left-right 37144 5.07 2.2
highskill 36722 0.49 0.5
retired 41758 0.12 0.33
unemployed 41758 0.03 0.17
in paid employment 41758 0.49 0.5
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Table 3: Belief variables by country
Econ Fiscal Wage Jobs
Austria 0.47 0.24 0.35 0.24
Belgium 0.3 0.18 0.5 0.2
Switzerland 0.55 0.18 0.32 0.25
Czech Republic 0.26 0.14 0.43 0.15
Germany 0.4 0.13 0.31 0.15
Denmark 0.35 0.2 0.62 0.43
Spain 0.44 0.26 0.42 0.32
Finland 0.45 0.23 0.34 0.35
France 0.37 0.2 0.29 0.32
Great Britain 0.27 0.19 0.34 0.22
Greece 0.22 0.16 0.09 0.12
Hungary 0.2 0.09 0.18 0.11
Ireland 0.38 0.16 0.41 0.22
Israel 0.39 0.27 0.19 0.24
Italy 0.42 0.33 0.42 0.32
Luxembourg 0.66 0.27 0.45 0.37
Netherlands 0.34 0.24 0.55 0.32
Norway 0.45 0.27 0.59 0.45
Poland 0.27 0.17 0.32 0.18
Portugal 0.4 0.49 0.32 0.17
Sweden 0.47 0.28 0.5 0.57
Slovenia 0.24 0.16 0.41 0.17
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Table 4: Accuracy and directional goal variables by country
educ nwsnp ideallive sameculture
Austria 12.32 1.3 0.34 3.09
Belgium 12.2 1.11 0.41 3.39
Switzerland 10.84 1.3 0.17 2.92
Czech Republic 12.42 1.17 0.38 3.84
Germany 12.83 1.23 0.24 3.13
Denmark 13.19 1.35 0.37 3.17
Spain 10.21 1.27 0.33 3.56
Finland 11.96 1.24 0.31 3.41
France 11.94 1.23 0.23 3.4
Great Britain 12.72 1.14 0.26 3.17
Greece 9.74 1.27 0.44 4.15
Hungary 11.65 1.11 0.69 3.58
Ireland 12.99 1.55 0.34 3.11
Israel 12.82 1.43 0.41 3.47
Italy 10.73 1.14 0.28 3.38
Luxembourg 12.06 1.32 0.25 3.14
Netherlands 12.85 1.32 0.32 3.13
Norway 13.25 1.39 0.23 3.17
Poland 11.4 0.97 0.33 3.75
Portugal 7.44 1.34 0.37 3.78
Sweden 12.01 1.17 0.2 3.07
Slovenia 11.38 0.88 0.35 3.69
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Probit regression: Immigrants are good for the economy
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4)
educ 0.0190*** 0.0226*** 0.0156*** 0.0145***
(0.00265) (0.00479) (0.00282) (0.00281)
nwsnp 0.0298*** 0.0533**
(0.00592) (0.0211)
ideallive -0.114*** -0.177***
(0.0384) (0.0235)
sameculture -0.0548*** -0.0708***
(0.0186) (0.0132)
educ*ideallive -0.00886***
(0.00397)
educ*sameculture -0.00197
(0.00132)
nwsnp*ideallive -0.0104
(0.0147)
nwsnp*sameculture -0.00802
(0.00709)
bthyr -0.00248*** -0.00261*** -0.00195*** -0.00200***
(0.000287) (0.000325) (0.000356) (0.000398)
male 0.0833*** 0.0881*** 0.0928*** 0.0951***
(0.00954) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0118)
urban 0.0184 0.0204 0.0204 0.0209
(0.0147) (0.0159) (0.0153) (0.0167)
parim 0.0253** 0.0280*** 0.0233 0.0288*
(0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0173) (0.0158)
imfriend 0.0777*** 0.0770*** 0.0773*** 0.0767***
(0.00663) (0.00614) (0.00998) (0.00881)
lr -0.0160*** -0.0139*** -0.0170*** -0.0145***
(0.00366) (0.00360) (0.00431) (0.00420)
highskill 0.0602*** 0.0618*** 0.0624*** 0.0614***
(0.00918) (0.0112) (0.0127) (0.0139)
retired -0.0212* -0.0206** -0.0224** -0.0222*
(0.0109) (0.00967) (0.0110) (0.0113)
unemp -0.0496*** -0.0519*** -0.0640** -0.0705**
(0.0154) (0.0164) (0.0262) (0.0278)
paidemp -0.0138 -0.0185 -0.0130 -0.0191
(0.0139) (0.0158) (0.0167) (0.0182)
Observations 27562 27892 21830 22087
Pseudo R2 0.0984 0.0999 0.103 0.105
The sample includes only citizens of the majority ethnic group. Marginal effects holding all other variables at their
mean value are shown with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country. The marginal effect, standard
errors and statistical significance of the interaction terms are calculated using the stata program inteff.ado written
by Edward Norton et al. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%. Country dummies are included
in all estimations (coefficients not shown). Observations are weighted according to ESS guidelines.
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Probit regression: Immigrants have a positive fiscal impact
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4)
educ 0.00628*** 0.0119*** 0.00648*** 0.00579***
(0.00167) (0.00356) (0.00193) (0.00173)
nwsnp 0.00302 0.00515
(0.00874) (0.0110)
ideallive -0.0338 -0.0712***
(0.0257) (0.0103)
sameculture -0.0121 -0.0412***
(0.0120) (0.00377)
educ*ideallive -0.00511***
(0.001794)
educ*sameculture -0.00281***
(0.000990)
nwsnp*ideallive -0.00818
(0.005258)
newsnp*sameculture -0.00134
(0.002431)
bthyr -0.000668** -0.000766** -0.000882*** -0.000987***
(0.000318) (0.000301) (0.000283) (0.000301)
male 0.0160*** 0.0198*** 0.0136* 0.0160*
(0.00586) (0.00530) (0.00795) (0.00855)
urban 0.0346*** 0.0335*** 0.0302** 0.0279**
(0.00974) (0.00851) (0.0123) (0.0108)
parim 0.0195*** 0.0224*** 0.0205*** 0.0239***
(0.00350) (0.00298) (0.00489) (0.00407)
imfriend 0.0322*** 0.0299*** 0.0327*** 0.0302***
(0.00701) (0.00762) (0.00726) (0.00830)
lr -0.00919*** -0.00789** -0.00950*** -0.00817***
(0.00307) (0.00319) (0.00296) (0.00284)
highskill 0.0127*** 0.0130*** 0.0160** 0.0142*
(0.00346) (0.00357) (0.00672) (0.00758)
retired -0.0492*** -0.0484*** -0.0416*** -0.0413***
(0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0100) (0.00996)
unemp -0.0174 -0.0192 -0.0157 -0.0207
(0.0247) (0.0232) (0.0413) (0.0395)
paidemp -0.00635 -0.00935 -0.0149 -0.0187
(0.00913) (0.00948) (0.0123) (0.0122)
Observations 27477 27779 21719 21948
Pseudo R2 0.0555 0.0603 0.0580 0.0628
The sample includes only citizens of the majority ethnic group. Marginal effects holding all other variables at their
mean value are shown with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country. The marginal effect, standard
errors and statistical significance of the interaction terms are calculated using the stata program inteff.ado written
by Edward Norton et al. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%. Country dummies are included
in all estimations (coefficients not shown). Observations are weighted according to ESS guidelines.
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Probit regression: Immigrants don't lower wages
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4)
educ 0.0157*** 0.0214*** 0.0150*** 0.0129***
(0.00309) (0.00527) (0.00323) (0.00320)
nwsnp 0.0268*** 0.0259
(0.00225) (0.0223)
ideallive -0.133*** -0.116***
(0.0233) (0.0109)
sameculture -0.0536*** -0.0837***
(0.0128) (0.0107)
educ*ideallive 0.00146
(0.001623)
educ*sameculture -0.00261***
(0.000973)
nwsnp*ideallive -0.00130***
(0.004613)
nwsnp*sameculture -0.00179
(0.005988)
bthyr -0.00146* -0.00163** -0.00149** -0.00168***
(0.000800) (0.000739) (0.000585) (0.000540)
male -0.0149 -0.00861 -0.0266** -0.0233**
(0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0119)
urban -0.00323 -0.00272 0.00372 0.00290
(0.0152) (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.0133)
parim 0.00826 0.0108 0.000386 0.00454
(0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0159) (0.0161)
imfriend 0.0624*** 0.0556*** 0.0617*** 0.0552***
(0.00685) (0.00652) (0.0109) (0.00917)
lr -0.00680** -0.00309 -0.00585* -0.00193
(0.00271) (0.00263) (0.00312) (0.00337)
highskill 0.0512*** 0.0500*** 0.0505*** 0.0475***
(0.00938) (0.00990) (0.0115) (0.0116)
retired 0.000152 0.00114 -0.00622 -0.00917
(0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0165) (0.0169)
unemp -0.0316 -0.0331 -0.0696* -0.0747**
(0.0321) (0.0340) (0.0360) (0.0373)
paidemp 0.0499*** 0.0459*** 0.0589*** 0.0540***
(0.00743) (0.00697) (0.00809) (0.00823)
Observations 27600 27919 21785 22036
Pseudo R2 0.0803 0.0929 0.0823 0.0951
The sample includes only citizens of the majority ethnic group. Marginal effects holding all other variables at their
mean value are shown with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country. The marginal effect, standard
errors and statistical significance of the interaction terms are calculated using the stata program inteff.ado written
by Edward Norton et al. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%. Country dummies are included
in all estimations (coefficients not shown). Observations are weighted according to ESS guidelines.
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Probit regression: Immigrants create jobs
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4)
educ 0.00805*** 0.0123*** 0.00658*** 0.00582***
(0.00211) (0.00439) (0.00103) (0.000982)
nwsnp 0.0205*** 0.0356***
(0.00769) (0.00750)
ideallive -0.0527* -0.0878***
(0.0290) (0.0187)
sameculture -0.0177 -0.0377***
(0.0109) (0.00714)
educ*ideallive -0.00529**
(0.00269)
educ*sameculture -0.00229**
(0.000982)
nwsnp*ideallive -0.01817
(0.014623)
nwsnp*sameculture -0.00708***
(0.001925)
bthyr -0.00158*** -0.00156*** -0.00161*** -0.00158***
(0.000368) (0.000374) (0.000553) (0.000570)
male 0.0149*** 0.0180*** 0.0188** 0.0197**
(0.00530) (0.00521) (0.00918) (0.00908)
urban 0.000368 0.000859 -0.00165 -0.00193
(0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0157) (0.0158)
parim 0.0327*** 0.0347*** 0.0309** 0.0341***
(0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0129) (0.0131)
imfriend 0.0525*** 0.0511*** 0.0535*** 0.0518***
(0.00827) (0.00802) (0.0112) (0.0104)
lr -0.00543*** -0.00466*** -0.00397** -0.00286
(0.00193) (0.00163) (0.00200) (0.00174)
highskill 0.0279*** 0.0288*** 0.0337*** 0.0328***
(0.00898) (0.00915) (0.00999) (0.0100)
retired -0.0219*** -0.0196** -0.0228** -0.0239**
(0.00753) (0.00762) (0.00994) (0.00998)
unemp -0.0363 -0.0371 -0.0230 -0.0271
(0.0299) (0.0265) (0.0476) (0.0448)
paidemp -0.0164** -0.0191** -0.0209** -0.0244***
(0.00805) (0.00796) (0.00899) (0.00836)
Observations 27857 28177 21966 22218
Pseudo R2 0.0706 0.0706 0.0760 0.0760
The sample includes only citizens of the majority ethnic group. Marginal effects holding all other variables at their
mean value are shown with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country. The marginal effect, standard
errors and statistical significance of the interaction terms are calculated using the stata program inteff.ado written
by Edward Norton et al. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%. Country dummies are included
in all estimations (coefficients not shown). Observations are weighted according to ESS guidelines.
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